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The sites I saw were disfigured, effaced. They were 
non-sites of memory (non-lieux de la mémoire).  
The places no longer resembled what they had been.1
Record
I would like to begin with a reference to the basic topic of the periodical, in 
which the word record seems the most intriguing. That formulation has already 
been discussed by Lager, Gulag, and camp researchers. Arkadiusz Morawiec, and 
Lesław M. Bartelski2 before him, referred to the type of records, i.e. post-camp 
narratives, differentiating first-person and third-person ones. Morawiec wrote:
In the case of a consistent usage of first-person narrative, the author [applied to Seweryna Szma-
glewska and Smoke Over Birkenau – note by KKK] – wanting to maintain a pretence of objecti-
vity – would have to document her extensive knowledge of the camp each time, which she could 
not have gained through her own experience (of over two years’ internment at a Lager), i.e.: 
be everywhere. She did, in fact, mention in the introduction her “long internment at Birkenau” 
[...], yet a large portion of the information included in the book must have been second-hand 
knowledge. It would be difficult to assume that the author witnessed herself an orgy of SS men, 
that she visited men’s barracks, or observed up close the burning of corpses in pits in Birkenau. 
Thus, the panoramic image of the camp in Auschwitz included in the first-person recollections 
in Anus mundi by Wiesław Kielar seems no less convincing, objective, or reliable. He was more 
“ubiquitous” than Szmaglewska. He spent over four years in Auschwitz-Birkenau. As a prisoner, 
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pamięci, M. Saryusz-Wolska, R. Traba (eds.), collaborator J. Kalicka, Scholar, Warsaw 2014, p. 272. 
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he went through several levels of the camp ladder: he was a corpse carrier, he pulled out the 
corpses of Soviet POWs gassed in one of the blocks, he was a kapo, a writer (Schreiber), he 
worked in various kommandos, and he spent twenty nights in a Stehbunker, a standing cell. Yet 
what seemed most important was that female internees had less freedom to move around a Lager 
due to a smaller spectrum of employment opportunities. Thus a question arises whether almost 
solely indirect narration of Smoke…, visible in the direct expressions by the narrator to a more or 
less concrete you, usually a co-internee, was not, paradoxically, less objective and reliable than 
a first-person narration. Such a doubt can be found in Tadeusz Borowski’s stipulation towards 
Zofia Kossak, the author of a Birkenau memoir entitled Z otchłani: «one cannot write indirectly 
about Oświęcim» [a quote from the famous review entitled “Alicja w krainie czarów” [Alice in 
Wonderland], Pokolenie 1947, issue 1, p. 9 – note KKK].3
Further in the text it will become evident why that rather lengthy quote is 
so important. For now, let me quote, to my own surprise, Stanisław Lem, who in 
“Terminus” (in the Opowieści o pilocie Pirxie series) wrote: “One thing is certain: 
that record, if it is a record at all, is not dead. Whoever those people – the voices, 
the strikes – are, it is possible to talk to them. If one is only brave enough...”4 
Those words could be referred to many camp, Lager, or Gulag writings, which we 
as literary scientists, historians, or, more broadly, humanists call (to quote Roman 
Zimand) personal document literature,5 and, to quote Jerzy Jedlicki, we strive to 
organise them as “experienced stories” and/or “testified history”.6
In my study, however, I propose something different. I propose to delve deep 
into the oxymoron which the formulation of Lager essays seems to be. Extermi-
nation essays are already rare. Primo Levi, Jean Améry,7 Maurice Blanchot,8 Bog-
dan Dawid Wojdowski.9 There are not too many of those. They possess a roughly 
discussed specificity.10 Lager-related? I.e. some special variant of location essays, 
or geo-essays? Or maybe the act of trying (from the French essayer) non-site?11
3 A. Morawiec, Literatura w lagrze, lager w literaturze. Fakt – temat – metafora, Wydawnic-
two Akademii Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej, Łódź 2009, pp. 189–190.
4 As cited in: A. Gajewska, Zagłada i gwiazdy. Przeszłość w prozie Stanisława Lema, Wydaw-
nictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2016, p. 212. [Unless otherwise indicated, the English versions of 
all texts originally in Polish were translated from Polish]
5 R. Zimand, Diarysta Stefan Ż., Ossolineum, Wrocław 1990.
6 J. Jedlicki, “Dzieje doświadczone i dzieje zaświadczone”, in: Dzieło literackie jako źródło 
historyczne, Z. Stefanowska and J. Sławiński, Czytelnik, Warsaw 1978, pp. 344–371.
7 I am referring in particular to the essay entitled Mein Judentum, as well as the Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sühne and Über das Altern collections.
8 Cf. M. Blanchot, Niezniszczalne. Być Żydem, trans. W. Błońska, Literatura na Świecie 1996, 
issue 10, pp. 59–68.
9 B. Wojdowski, “Judaizm jako los”, Puls 1993, issue 3. More on the subject, cf. K. Kuczyń-
ska-Koschany, “Eseiści kondycji żydowskiej – po Zagładzie: Maurice Blanchot i Bogdan Dawid 
Wojdowski”, Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Literacka, vol. 30 (2017), pp. 385–399.
10 More on the subject, vide A. Ubertowska, Holokaust. Auto(tanato)grafie, Wydawnictwo IBL 
PAN, Warsaw 2014.
11 More on the subject, vide P. Czapliński, Nie-miejsce, pp. 270–272. Czapliński called non-site 
“a category of the anthropological scope over space” (p. 270), defined, i.a. in relation to memory 
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Two thinkers (I am not referring to them as philosophers on purpose) decided, 
independently of each other, to record the experience of the space of a Lager, one 
which is unrecordable yet which defines the borderlines of imagination. The es-
says by Otton Dov Kulka (born in 1933) from the Landscapes of the Metropolis of 
Death collection, and Écorces by Georges Didi-Huberman (the author of Images 
malgré tout)12 entered into a creative debate with the title formulation of the book 
by Wiesław Kielar (1919–1990) Anus mundi, published in 1966 (date of comple-
tion recorded by the author was 21 January 1966).13 They did that in two different 
manners, between which, however, one could notice a certain tertium compara-
tionis – a reverse approach in relation to the “anus of the world”. They tried to 
write an essay, i.e. something just as strange as (once for Adorn) a poem, a poem 
by Paul Celan, after Auschwitz.
Anus mundi
The formulation itself of anus mundi has an interesting, and possibly not 
widely known story to it. In the introduction to Wiesław Kielar’s book (bear in 
mind: Auschwitz internee No. 290, i.e. one of the earliest numbers in Auschwitz 
among those who survived), one could read that it was Birkenau/Brzezinka that 
an SS doctor Hauptsturmführer Thilo called the “rectum of the world” (upon se-
lecting and putting to death 800 women):
That opinion, he continued, was recorded by his colleague Johann Paul Kremer, also an SS 
doctor, a university professor, doctor of medicine and philosophy, under the date 5 September 
1942 as he wrote verbatim: “Today at midday during a special operation from the women’s 
and individual identity. The Poznań anthropologist developed that notion based on Thomas More 
(Utopia, 1516), who differentiated between the Greek ou-tόpos and eu-tόpos; he indicated Michel de 
Certeau as being the first to use the term non-lieu, in a work entitled The Practice of Everyday Life 
(1980), that special proper name of a “hollow or non-site bored by the law of another”, overburdened 
with individualised memory, and untameable. Another well-known usage of the term was an essay 
by Marc Augé entitled Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (1995), who 
“thus called places devoid of memory, and which do not constitute the locum of authorities, and yet 
which are untameable, and not supporting general sovereignty”. For my discussion, most important 
is Czapliński’s remark: “Within the polemic with Pierre Nora’s concept (and independently of Augé’s 
reflection), Claude Lanzmann concluded that when he arrived at former concentration camps, he 
found «non-sites of memory» [...] «The sites I saw were disfigured, effaced. [...] The places no longer 
resembled what they had been». […] it is possible that Lanzmann referred to the radical inability 
of a camp/place of memory to bring back memories, i.e. indicate the meanings of the central 
site, which in a camp was the gas chamber, and help realise the difference between the space of 
life outside the camp, and the space of death inside it” (p. 272, bolding KKK)
12 G. Didi-Huberman, Obrazy mimo wszystko, trans. M. Kubiak Ho-Chi, Universitas, Krakow 
2008.
13 1st edition – 1966, 2nd edition – 1972, 3rd edition – 1980.
234 Katarzyna Kuczyńska-Koschany
camp: an utter atrocity. Hauptsturmführer Thilo, the garrison doctor, was right when he told me 
today that we are at anus mundi (the rectum of the world).14
Mieczysław Kieta, the author of the introduction to Kielar’s book, thus 
explained the formulation uttered during the mass killing referring to Antoni 
Kępiński’s words:
Anus mundi as uttered by the garrison doctor SS Heinz Thilo was for that place a term expres-
sing, on the one hand, the disgust and terror which a concentration camp evoked in anyone who 
saw it [...], and, on the other, it justified the existence of the camp with the need to cleanse the 
world. Within the concept of a Nazi death camp – apart from the direct political-economic goal 
consisting of the most effective and cost-efficient method of exterminating the enemy – it had 
a deeper sense; that was to cleanse the German race of anything that did not correspond to the 
ideal of a German Übermensch (AM, 13–14).
The first printed version of Kępiński’s text entitled Anus mundi appeared in 
Przegląd Lekarski in 1965, issue 1. While Mieczysław Kieta stated that the title 
Anus mundi “was accepted by the Publishing House as the title of Kielar’s memoir” 
– also (not exclusively) – because “it offered the most concise expression of the 
functions of a Nazi death camp”. (AM, 14) Therefore, the anus mundi formulation 
was not Kielar’s original choice, as it resulted from Kępiński’s reflection, who 
wrote that “Death camps revealed the truth about man, which humanity has not 
yet been able to digest” (RO, fourth cover page).
In Kępiński’s Refleksje oświęcimskie, published in 2005 and edited by Zdzi-
sław Jan Ryn, there are two major thematic parts:
The first one entitled Anus mundi includes articles devoted to camp reality, and its traumatic 
outcomes. They were printed during the author’s life, and later collected in a book entitled 
Rytm życia. The second part, Homo homini lupus est, includes articles with a broader thematic 
scope […], and two unpublished typescripts from the 1960s.15
In an article entitled Anus mundi, Antoni Kępiński referred to that term as 
being “blunt”, and wrote, e.g.:
Within the Nazi concept, death camps – apart from the direct political-economic goal con-
sisting of the most effective and cost-efficient method of exterminating the enemy – they had 
a deeper sense; that was to cleanse the German race of anything that did not correspond to the 
ideal of a German Übermensch. It carried the distant vision of a world of beautiful humans, 
strong and healthy, a world where there would be no place for the sick, disabled, mentally 
abnormal, tainted with Jewish or gypsy blood.
14 W. Kielar, Anus mundi, 3rd edition, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow 1980, p. 13. Hereinaf-
ter as AM, with a page number. Cf. also: W. Sofsky, Die Ordnung des Terrors. Das Konzentrations-
lager, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1993.
15 Z.J. Ryn, “Wstęp”, in: A. Kępiński, Refleksje oświęcimskie, selection and introduction 
Z.J. Ryn, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Krakow 2005, p. 8. Hereinafter as RO, with a page number.
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For that “beautiful” goal, it was necessary to proceed through horrible atrocities of con-
centration camps. No wonder, then, that service at a camp was considered equal to service 
at the front, though SS men probably preferred to be heroes in a camp than at the front. The 
principle of remaining alive is usually stronger than ideology; even better when proud ideology 
helps justify one’s cowardice. Yet there were also some, however few, who could not bear the 
debasement of the service at a camp, and chose the front or suicide. The majority calmed their 
consciences with alcohol, and a sense of fulfilled duty for the good of the homeland, and the 
grand idea (RO, 11–12).
Kępiński indicated that those “who were the obstacle, material designated 
for extermination, so that they would not contaminate the new world any more” 
were differently disposed towards the principles of that world: either fatalistically 
as irreversible fate, or pragmatically as an opportunity to emulate with a horizon 
a possible survival, or different still – for that rarest attitude I cannot find the right 
term, therefore I quote:
There were also those who despite the hunger, thirst, cold, pain, and humiliation were able to 
somewhat distance themselves from their suffering, and not to think only about finding some-
thing to eat, in order to stop feeling cold or hot, for the tormented body to stop aching. The 
biological imperative is extraordinarily strong, and it requires a strong will not to think about 
bread when you are hungry, about water when you are thirsty, or about an aching place when in 
pain. That effort was, in fact, necessary to maintain internal freedom – a free space where you 
could think, dream, and plan freely, associate decisions, and liberate yourself from the horror 
of the present. If in camp life, in that anus mundi, there was so much sacrifice, courage, and 
love for man, i.e. phenomena which in those conditions, it would seem, were virtually impos-
sible, it was so thanks to that internal freedom (RO, 15).
Personal document literature offered the basis for a paraphrase of the expres-
sion anus mundi in the title of a historical work. A monograph by Zygmunt Zonik, 
a Buchenwald internee, who participated in the death marches, a researcher and 
a documentary film-maker, which described the evacuation and the liberation of 
Lagers, published in 1988, was entitled Anus belli (rectum of war). Zonik did not 
refer to Kielar in any location of his book which exceeded four hundred pages. He 
only wrote that “they did not have to kill”, meaning the final acts of the oppres-
sors, and the killing of tens of thousands of war victims. The similarity of the titles 
is, however, deeply intriguing, and it resulted not only, I believe, from pre-WWII 
education with its obligatory knowledge of Latin in combination with personal 
and long-term camp experience.16
They, i.e. both formulations: anus mundi, and anus belli, are semantically 
related to Joseph Conrad’s “heart of darkness”,17 and yet extremely different from 
16 Z. Zonik, Anus belli. Ewakuacja i wyzwolenie hitlerowskich obozów koncentracyjnych, 
PWN, Warsaw 1988.
17 Vide J. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Penguin Books, London 1994. 
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it as they refer to an area which had rather been tabooised than subjected to met-
aphorisation. In thinking about the “heart of darkness”, we can continue to foster 
the aesthetic illusion of Europeans or an illusion of an illusion (today, in the post- 
-colonial epoch, we are not doing that any more, yet it lasted long before we started 
thinking about the genocide in Africa as genocide in this world, not some other 
world); when one reads the title – anus belli or anus mundi – there is no question 
of any illusions.
And that was what struck me – how is an essay, the area of nuance par exellen-
ce, related to that? Who speaks when an essayist speaks? It was not the motifs of 
the originators or the victims that were sought after by Kępiński, Kielar, Borowski, 
or Szmaglewska. Nor, not completely in any case, the witness. Who then? And how 
can she/he be still someone else? And why in both selected essays, are two words 
incessantly repeated: memory and imagination?
Écorces
Paul Celan, whose Todesfuge caused probably the biggest debate on the ap-
propriateness of writing poems after Shoah, a debate between a poet and a philos-
opher, from which poetry emerged victorious, though changed, also the poetry of 
Celan himself, whose parents died in the Romanian camp of mass extermination 
in Transnistria,18 wrote that poems are a slightly better bark of plane trees. He also 
indicated the particular feature of the bark of those trees which look as if wound-
ed. Somewhat similar features were assigned by Georges Didi-Huberman to the 
bark torn off of birches in Birkenau: “I looked at those three scraps of bark as if 
at three letters of a pre-alphabet writing”; “three scraps with grey, almost white 
surface”, “pink like flesh”, falling off in rolls as if the remnants of a burnt book.19
Écorces asks synecdochally about the history of killing, about the presence 
of the unimaginable in the organic: a theoretician who is helpless writes an essay. 
At the beginning of the essay, he studies the texture of the bark (mortal matter), 
to eventually write about issues of exceptional importance – he indicates another 
“image against all odds”:
What the bark tells me about the tree. What the tree tells me about the forest. What the forest, 
a birch forest, tells me about Birkenau. That image, of course, just like the other ones, is just 
a trifle. A trifle, a superficial trifle: a film, depositing silver halides, materialising pixels. Eve-
rything always on the surface, layered. Technical surfaces indicating only the surface of things. 
What does it tell about the depths, what depths does it reach? Most images – I’m aware of that 
– remain without any consequences. […]
18 More on the subject, vide T. Snyder, Black Earth. The Holocaust as History and Warning, 
Tim Duggan Books, New York 2015.
19 G. Didi-Huberman, Kora, trans. T. Swoboda, W podwórku, Gdańsk 2013, p. 7–8. Hereinafter 
referred to as K, with a page number. [English version translated from Polish]
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Not all images, though, remain without consequence for others. There are also those – like 
the images made by a member of Sonderkommando at Birkenau – which turn out to be a col-
lective act, not just a regular private trophy or trinket. There are sometimes surfaces which 
change the depths of the surroundings. Philosophers of pure ideas, mystics of the Saint of the 
Saints think about the surface only as make-up, a lie: that which conceals the true essence 
of things. So pretence vs. the essence, appearance vs. substance. But you could also say that 
a substance existing outside the surface is only a metaphysical illusion. You could say that the 
surface is something that falls off of things: which comes directly from them, separates from 
them, so originates in things. And which separates in order to come and meet us, stand before 
our eyes, as if a scrap of bark. If only we decide to bend down to lift a few pieces (K, 85–87, 
bolding GDH).
What happens at the end of Didi-Huberman’s essay is key to touch (exactly 
that, touch, not understand or settle) the experience of Shoah, and a Lager being 
that non-site where it also occurred. Suddenly it turns out that “The bark is no 
less real that the trunk” (K, 87), that it is “irregular, non-continuous, diverse”, it is 
impurity, accidentality, diversity, abundance, relativity – and yet it comes from the 
essence of things. At that point there appear fundamental expressions in relation 
to the topic of the “record”: bark, according to the essayist, “is located somewhere 
between the elusive pretence and surviving record. Or, in fact, it means a re-
corded pretence, the entire elusiveness of our life’s decisions, our active and pas-
sive experiences.” (K, 88) A few almost random photographs – neither revelation 
nor dejection – thus Didi-Huberman perceived his disposition at Birkenau. Sud-
denly: those photographs prove almost random (“A few images are nothing for 
such a story”, K, 90). The essayist explained the meaning of that almost/although:
For my memory they are, though, like a few scraps of bark: pieces of skin, a body. According 
to etymologists, the French word écorce is a mediaeval extension of the Latin scortea, meaning 
“a leather coat”. [...] Classical Latin made a valuable differentiation: there is not one skin, 
but two. First, there is the epidermis, i.e. cortex. It is the outer part of a tree, which we cut off, 
“decork” first. The Indo-European core of the word – present in the Sanskrit words krtih and 
krttih – refers both to skin and a knife, which wounds it or cuts it off. In that sense bark signifies 
the borderline part of the body, vulnerable first to strikes, wounding, cutting off, and removal.
Then, as a designation of the place where it adheres to the trunk – which corresponds 
to dermis – Latin created another word revealing another facet of the first one: it is liber, 
meaning part of bark, which is better than cortex as a material for writing. Therefore, the 
word somewhat naturally offered the name for the things necessary for recording the scraps of 
our memories: things built of only surfaces, of cut up pieces of cellulose pressed from trees, on 
the surface of which there will appear words and images. those are things falling out of our 
thought known as books. Things falling off during peeling off the skin, the bark of harmoni-
sed texts and images (K, 90–91, bolding KKK).
Finding the site within a non-site was achieved in the most painful way by the 
French essayist. The fact it would be possible in an attempt, thanks to an essay, was 
no prior knowledge, offered in advance, no assumption. The essay is, obviously, the 
highest risk of recording, it is assumptionless, and inconclusive. And in addition 
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to that: amorphous. So it offers no support. It demands, in turn, extreme and de-
tailed, sometimes report-like, honesty towards oneself:
I entered the main guardhouse. I photographed the windows overlooking the selection ramp. 
My friend Henri who accompanied me, and whose mild persistence induced me to make this 
trip, claims that I said: “It’s unimaginable”. I said that, of course, I said that like everyone 
does. Yet if I am to continue to write, view, frame, photograph, develop photographs, and think 
about it all, I will do it exactly to make that sentence incomplete. It would be necessary to say: 
“It is unimaginable so I must imagine it regardless”. To, at least, present something, with 
a minimum of that which we can know about it.
I watched, it was unimaginable, and yet so simple (K, 36–37, bolding KKK).
That “unimaginable” and “yet so simple”, which one has to imagine regard-
less, enables one to notice the most important things:
It is completely different in Birkenau [than in Auschwitz – note KKK]. Here, there are almost 
no walls left. Yet the scale cannot lie, and it strikes with incredible force – a force of terror and 
despair. The earth cannot lie either. Auschwitz is becoming more like a museum today while 
Birkenau remains only an archaeological site. Or at least that is the impression it makes when 
we look at what can still be seen, where everything was destroyed: for example cracked, wound- 
ed, riddled, broken surface. It is a cut, mauled, opened surface. It is a scratched devastated 
surface, it is a surface which evokes screams.
Such a place requires the visitor to consider at some point her/his own act of watching 
(K, 31–32).
Imagination afterwards
The records by Otto Kulka, an Auschwitz survivor, “a child of the Lager”, are 
different. His memory and imagination corrected each other.
Yet both, Didi-Huberman and Kulka, went to Birkenau. The latter identified 
the features of a place in which he once had been, but as a different person:
But it was no longer the Metropolis of Death that it had been. It was a very melancholy land-
scape. A landscape fraught with desolation. But everything was there, but at a kind of distance. 
At a distance of desolation, but very searing. [...] Auschwitz had been buried. Buried but 
nonetheless expansive, like a kind of vast grave from horizon to horizon. But everything was 
there, and I, at least, was able to recognise it.20
Muteness and desolation. A piece of a crematorium brick, “black and sooty” 
(PMŚ, 28). “It was impossible to enter the gas chamber, because the roof had 
collapsed into it and blocked the entrance”, (PMŚ, 30) wrote the essayist. In front 
of Birkenau’s gate, a random taxi driver takes of photo of him with his Leica, his 
20 O.D. Kulka, Pejzaże metropolii śmierci. Rozmyślania o pamięci i wyobraźni, trans. 
M. Szczubiałka, Czarne, Wołowiec 2014, p. 25. Hereinafter as PMŚ, with a page number. [English 
version: Kulka, D.O. Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death. Harvard University Press 2013]
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partner in his travels through the landscapes of the metropolis of death. At that 
point, he makes a special confession:
In the plane, which tossed back and forth – it was a small plane – I wrote some mad things in 
my diary that I always carry with me. I also wrote them in a letter; I don’t know if the letter 
still exists (PMŚ, 31, bolding KKK).
That is a particular difference between Didi-Huberman, whose family partly 
perished in Shoah, and Kulka, who reproduced the images from his Theriesenstadt 
family camp, of small death, and how it was related to the great death, a scene 
of flogging as a ritual of the “system of everyday life”, images from a camp of 
spectres – Auschwitz of the autumn of 1944/winter of 1945. He was prisoner to 
old landscapes, thus the inability to record, maintained in a series: “mad things” 
in his diary – a letter – an essay:
I remained in that Metropolis, a prisoner of that Metropolis, of that immutable law which leaves 
no place for being rescued, for violating this terrible ‘justice’ by which Auschwitz must remain 
Auschwitz. Thus the immutable law remained for me and thus did I remain caught up within 
it, which was actually what I discovered when I returned decades later. In that return, with 
the completion of the last act, which I had not then been ‘privileged’ to experience – the act 
of descending into the ruins that survived, at least to those of the gas chamber and the 
crematorium – that immutable law ran its course, [...] the “crowning glory was restored” and 
closes the odyssey in which I remained yoked and bound to that place (PMŚ, 66, bolding KKK).
Maybe the main feature of Kulka’s essay is its amorphism. One which is 
visible in the richness of forms, their excess. Poems, prose, memoir fragments, re-
port fragments, dated notes of various types and various locations, dream-like and 
experienced while being awake, identified through their titles. In a word: redun-
dancy. In the case of Didi-Huberman, one has the impression of layering particles, 
overlapping each other, a certain bark-ness. In this case: on the contrary, slicing. 
Yet there exists one unifying element. The incessant sense of déjà vu, which 
accompanies the author in the least expected locations: in Stutthof, in Jerusalem, 
in Prague. Paradoxically, the blueness of a summer sky in the camp, which the 
eleven-year-old boy, later an adult, and finally an old man, cannot escape:
The only belonging blue overcoming every other colour, imprinted in my memory as the colour 
of summer, the colour of tranquillity, the colour of forgetting – momentary forgetting – is that 
colour of a Polish summer in 1944. And for that little boy who is part of that summer, all this 
will remain for all time as a touchstone of beauty, nonpareil in all the landscapes I have collec-
ted into myself and which I will probably be able to collect – how to put it, in a phrase – for all 
time. [...] there is no doubt that to here I will always return. This return, even if it is divorced 
from that sombre return from which there is no way out, is itself a return which has no way out. 
The colour is the colour of childhood, a colour of innocence, a colour of beauty. And this too is 
an immutable law from which there is no escape. There is no escape from beauty, from the sense 
of beauty at the height and in the midst of the Great Death which governs all (PMŚ, 110–111).
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Conclusions
By analogy to Marianne Hirsch’s postmemory, in the case of the more re-
cent Lager essays, one can talk about post-imagination, that which has occurred 
in the essay after Auschwitz, while by analogy to the category of auto(thanato)
graphy (Derrida’s, modified by Aleksandra Ubertowska) – about auto(thanato)
imaginative.
If, however, postmemory is a category in which one is, as it were, tossed ac-
cording to her/his generation, then post-imagination, imagination altered in essays 
(as well as in poetry) after Auschwitz (or, rather, more often – after Birkenau), 
proves an individual category, it requires an extreme individual effort, an effort 
pushing the borders of human intellectual capabilities.
In post-imagination, the camp is no longer equal to the term of anus mundi. 
No physiologically or eugenically understood “cleansing” occurs, nor, all the less, 
an ideological catharsis. Yet that rare moment, seized by Didi-Huberman, of the 
co-existence of the unimaginable, and its barely imaginable – also for the essay-
ists themselves: of a record.
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Georges Didi-Huberman, Écorces, and otto Dov Kulka, Landscapes of the Metropolis 
of Death – as Lager essays? Imagination and remembrance of the title formulations  
in relation to the formulation „anus mundi”
(Summary)
The article is an attempt at interpretation of two essays, which may be called „Lager” essays. 
These are Écorces written by G. Didi-Huberman and Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death writ-
ten by O.D. Kulka, their books are deeply related as the negation or at least as the questioning of 
the title of autobiographical book Anus mundi written by W. Kielar. Both authors do not describe 
Nazi concentration camp as „the anus of the world”. Their imagination is a post-imagination, their 
memory is a post-memory. In her paper Kuczyńska-Koschany considers the condition of the essay 
as quasi-genre after the Holocaust, after the genocide and in reference to the experience of a Lager.
Key words: Lager essay; formulation „anus mundi”; postimagination; postmemory; Georges 
Didi-Huberman; Otto Dov Kulka; Wiesław Kielar
